Alaska is cold, isn’t it?

August 15 represents a symbolic and important day, when Presidents Trump and Putin met in Anchorage to facilitate the de-escalation of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Did it really happen that way? The premises on which this meeting was organized left little doubt: the encounter could only end in a stalemate.

The symbolic apparatus was striking: the choice of a symbolic location (which, until 1867, was a Russian territory before becoming the 49th state of the Union), red carpet on arrival, significant phrases like “we made progress,” “we had a productive conversation.”

In the article published in May on SDA Bocconi Insight, which analyzed the profile of five major “players” involved in this global dynamic, it was emphasized how important it was to involve the main actor at the negotiating table: once again, that opportunity was missed.

So why organize this summit? Let us try to analyze it through the lens of “negotiation communication.”

The Russian president appears consistent with his profile as a “calculator,” capable of great patience. His statement, “any agreement must not be sabotaged by Kyiv or its allies,” is not typical of an approach oriented toward openness and collaboration. It’s rather consistent with the style of a hegemon: diplomacy is used to exert pressure and (re)affirm his legitimacy on the global stage. It is as if he were saying that the other parties must adapt to the conditions he sets. His communicative style thus comes across as authoritarian.

The American president also appears consistent with his “gambler” style. Narrative ambiguity emerges once again: his phrases, “we made great progress” and “no deal until there is a deal,” clearly synthesize an approach aimed at keeping all options open, ready to claim any advances as part of his “game.” It is an opportunistic communication style, oriented more toward building domestic consensus than toward constructing a platform for genuine multilateral dialogue in which each party can present and discuss its interests. Not surprisingly, during the press conference, no space was given for journalists’ questions.

This dynamic reiterates what has already been discussed on previous occasions: an important opportunity, which could have served to advance negotiations on the conflict in Ukraine, was used for a theatrical performance with two voices, each pursuing its own goal (the first, to gain legitimacy on the international political-commercial-diplomatic scene; the second, to create domestic consensus and position himself as a champion of peace).

Yet history has much to teach us in this regard. When one acts as mediator—after having carefully prepared the ground—the directly interested parties are involved. This is what happened at Camp David (1978), where President Jimmy Carter created the conditions for Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin to meet for thirteen days, reaching a shared agreement. Naturally, Carter had indirect interests in achieving that agreement, but in that circumstance, he acted as a facilitator, which led to the signing of two documents that paved the way for the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty.

The Anchorage summit, even assuming it was intended to serve as a mediation platform, unfolded in a way that made it an apparent mediation and, at the same time, a distorted negotiation.

Subsequent events further clarified the limitations of this meeting. In fact, immediately after the Anchorage summit, Trump had a phone conversation described as “long and substantive” with President Zelensky, preparatory to a bilateral meeting soon to be held in Washington, DC. The Ukrainian president once again stated clearly that no agreement can be found without Ukraine’s involvement. In other words, Ukraine’s role is central in this debate, and bypassing it would mean compromising the credibility of the negotiation itself.

Europe, too, reacted cautiously to the summit. Some stressed the need for robust security guarantees, recalling mechanisms similar to those provided by NATO’s Article 5. The proposal launched back in March during the “London Summit on Ukraine” re-emerged, namely a peacekeeping coalition (the Coalition of the Willing) signaling Europe’s growing desire to assume an autonomous mediating role, based on a multilateral diplomatic approach. Meanwhile, Beijing has adopted a silent approach (consistent with its profile) but one that is strategic, with long-term global ambitions.

The idea of a trilateral meeting now appears more a fragile hope than a concrete prospect. President Putin remains reluctant to accept a direct meeting with President Zelensky without preliminary concessions. Prudence and mistrust, therefore, continue to characterize the international debate.

If the summit was merely a symbolic and “apparent” event, does it have no implications? Even appearances can sometimes carry significant weight. In this case, multilateral trust did not come out strengthened—quite the opposite. The Russian president obtained the visibility and legitimacy on the international diplomatic stage that he was likely seeking.

The issue already raised in the May article remains open: the search for a peace solution can hardly take place by proxy, especially when the intermediary does not have a mandate. To move forward, those who put themselves forward as mediators must truly act as such, that is, in a neutral, legitimate, impartial manner. Otherwise, as history teaches us, any mediation risks degenerating into self-interested negotiation, incapable of generating a sustainable long-term solution (Caporarello, Let’s negotiate, 2025).

In short, the negotiating context remains uncertain, marked by a constant tension between the search for valid multilateral solutions and the emergence of asymmetric bilateral dynamics. The United States seems willing to intervene but indirectly; indeed, it has offered a role of air support and logistical guarantees, but not direct military involvement through troop deployment. Russia has increased its international visibility and could further strengthen its position if no concrete reactions occur at the international level. China, for its part, would look favorably on a “limited” easing of relations, particularly between Washington and Moscow, as it would allow it to keep channels open with the West and further consolidate its already strong commercial position, especially with Moscow and Kyiv. This could enable it to propose itself as a facilitator of the conflict by calling Ukraine, Russia, the EU, and the United States to a common table.

In this scenario, Europe is not yet considered ready to assume a central role on its own. However, if it managed to present itself in a structured and cohesive manner, it could quickly acquire this role, for instance, through the Coalition of the Willing initiative.

On the same topic:

Caporarello - Are the talks between Russia, Ukraine and the rest of the world real negotiations? A technical analysis

Caporarello - Shocking, destabilizing, and theatrical: Donald Trump’s negotiation style