Nenad Kos
Associate Professor
Biography
Nenad Kos is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at Bocconi University, a position he has held since 2016. He is also affiliated with the Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) and is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).
He earned his PhD in Economics from Northwestern University in 2008, under the supervision of Asher Wolinsky, after completing his undergraduate studies in Economics at the University of Ljubljana. He joined Bocconi University as an Assistant Professor in 2008 and was promoted to Associate Professor in 2016.
Professor Kos’s research lies at the intersection of mechanism design, information economics, and behavioral approaches to economic institutions. His work investigates how economic agents behave and interact under conditions of informational asymmetry, ambiguity, and strategic interdependence, with applications to auctions, contracts, firm takeovers, and — more recently — behavioral responses within epidemic models.
His current research agenda focuses on extending models of bargaining to contexts where agents can invest in expertise or delegate negotiations to representatives, and on studying how such mechanisms influence outcomes and efficiency. More broadly, his work continues to explore the behavioral dimensions of strategic interaction in economic environments.
Recent Publications
- 2024
Pricing and Consumer Surplus in Monopoly with Product Design
KIM, K., N. KOS, "Pricing and Consumer Surplus in Monopoly with Product Design" in 2024 Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists October 31st and November 1st-2nd, 2024, Venice, Italy - 2023
Epidemics with behavior
CARNEHL, C., S. FUKUDA, N. KOS, "Epidemics with behavior", Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, vol. 207, pp. 105590 - 2023
Signaling covertly acquired information
EKMEKCI, M., N. KOS, "Signaling covertly acquired information", Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, vol. 214, pp. 105746 - 2021
Optimal pricing, private information and search for an outside offer
AUSTER, S., N. KOS, S. PICCOLO, "Optimal pricing, private information and search for an outside offer", The RAND Journal of Economics, 2021, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 758-777 - 2018
Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
CARRASCO, V., V. FARINHA LUZ, N. KOS, M. MESSNER, P. MONTEIRO, H. MOREIRA, "Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions", Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 177, pp. 245-279 - 2017
The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms
DI TILLIO, A., N. KOS, M. MESSNER, "The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms", Review of Economic Studies, 2017, vol. 84, no. 1, pp. 237-276 - 2016
Just Enough or All: Selling a Firm
EKMEKCI, M., N. KOS, R. VOHRA, "Just Enough or All: Selling a Firm", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2016, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 223-256 - 2016
Information in Tender Offers With a Large Shareholder
EKMEKCI, M., N. KOS, "Information in Tender Offers With a Large Shareholder", Econometrica, 2016, vol. 84, no. 1, pp. 87-139 - 2014
Asking questions
KOS, N., "Asking questions", Games and Economic Behaviour, 2014, vol. 87, pp. 642-650 - 2013
Extremal incentive compatible transfers
KOS, N., M. MESSNER, "Extremal incentive compatible transfers", Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 148, no. 1, pp. 134-164
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