Forty years after Chernobyl, is nuclear power really making a comeback?
The Chernobyl accident on April 26, 1986, marked a symbolic and political suspension in the civilian use of nuclear energy. Forty years later, the context has deeply changed, but the debate remains surprisingly similar: safety, costs, and strategic role. However, data and economic analyses invite caution: between high costs, uncertainties, and more competitive alternatives, the risk is that its return is a contingent response rather than a sustainable long-term strategy.
In my previous contribution to SDA Bocconi Insight, I recalled how “There are several reasons why some governments and companies are reconsidering investing in nuclear energy production.” Among these, even then, was energy security. Today, this element is even more central. After the 2022 Russian gas crisis, a new phase of instability linked to the Middle East has been added: according to Fatih Birol, Director of the International Energy Agency (IEA), the conflict in the area represents “the biggest threat to global energy security in history,” with potentially wider effects than the shocks of the 1970s. Birol himself emphasizes that the geopolitical risk premium on energy will remain structurally higher.
It is not surprising, therefore, that security of supply has returned to the center of energy policies. In a recent IEA survey among energy experts and professionals, 80% indicated energy security among the top three drivers of innovation, ahead of cost, emissions, and economic performance. In this framework, nuclear power re-emerges as a technology capable of providing stable and programmable production, particularly valuable in electrical systems increasingly exposed to price volatility and geopolitical tensions.
However, looking at the data, the nuclear "renaissance" appears so far more narrative than real. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, global capacity has gone from about 370 GW to just under 380 GW in twenty years, while production has remained substantially stable at around 2,600 TWh per year. In the same period, the number of reactors has slightly decreased, and the share of nuclear in the global electricity mix has reduced significantly, testifying to a much lower growth compared to that recorded by solar and wind. The quantitative comparison is stark: while nuclear has remained essentially stagnant, wind power has multiplied capacity and production by over an order of magnitude and solar by over two, moving from a marginal technology to one of the pillars of the global electricity system.
On the investment front, too, the distance is evident. According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, in 2025 global investments in energy transition reached 2.3 trillion dollars, but only about 36 billion went to nuclear, a marginal share compared to renewables, grids, and electrification. More than a balanced growth of technologies, what has been observed over the last twenty years is a true divergence.
This does not mean that the interest in nuclear power is not real. On the contrary, recent energy crises have reopened political space for this technology, even in Europe.
However, recent institutional analyses also invite caution: a study by the Bank of Italy highlights how a possible reintroduction of nuclear power would hardly produce significant reductions in electricity price levels, while it could contribute to reducing their volatility. In terms of energy security, the reduced dependence on hydrocarbons would be partially offset by new forms of technological dependence and fuel supply, while the contribution to decarbonization would be potentially relevant. However, strong uncertainties remain regarding costs, construction times, and the maturity of available technologies, which suggest a prudent approach.
Furthermore, a credible industrial policy cannot ignore certain economic elements. The first concerns costs. The most recent data on LCOE (levelized cost of electricity) show how photovoltaics and wind remain, in most markets, the cheapest sources for new capacity, while nuclear presents higher and, above all, more uncertain costs, linked to long construction times and significant financial risks. This uncertainty is also reflected in the need for support mechanisms: for example, in the British case of Hinkley Point C, the contract guarantees a price well above the market price for a long period, implying transfers exceeding 2 billion pounds a year borne by consumers.
The second element concerns the systemic effects of investments. Recent literature shows how investments in low-emission technologies are not neutral: they influence prices, profitability, and market efficiency. In particular, the entry of new nuclear or renewable capacity tends to reduce wholesale prices and margins for other operators, with significant redistributive effects along the supply chain. Moreover, the choice between nuclear and renewables is not indifferent in systemic terms: a recent scientific study shows how nuclear contributes more directly to production stability, while renewables require greater investments in grids and flexibility, but tend to generate higher overall welfare benefits.
Forty years after Chernobyl, therefore, nuclear power is no longer (only) a question of technological safety, but of the balance between energy security, costs, and market design. However, even if recent crises have strengthened its strategic relevance, nuclear power cannot be a shortcut, but a choice that entails costs, risks, and trade-offs that require a rigorous and non-emergency assessment.
Energy issues are among those addressed in the Master in Sustainability Management, directed by Matteo Di Castelnuovo.
