

# Fausto Panunzi

---

## Economics

FAUSTO.PANUNZI@UNIBOCCONI.IT

Via Roentgen 1

Tel. +39 025836 5327 Fax. +39 02 5836 3332

---

## Curriculum Vitae

1995-Ph.D., Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

1993-Ph.D., Economics (Dottorato di Ricerca), Università degli studi di Pavia

1992-93Visiting student, London School of Economics

1988Laurea (BA), Economics, Università Bocconi

## Academic position and/or Professional activities

Full Professor of Economics

2010- 2013Chairman, Department of Economics, Bocconi University

2001-2005Professor of Economics, University of Bologna

1998-2001Associate Professor of Economics, Bocconi University

1997 -1998Visiting Lecturer, University College London

1995-1998Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Pavia and Insubria

1995-1996 Research Fellow, Institut d'Economie Industrielle (IDEI), Université des Sciences Sociales, Toulouse

1994 -1995 Fellow, IGIER, Università Bocconi

## Research Interests

- Corporate theory
- Corporate finance
- Contract theory

## Publications

"Minority Block and Takeover Premia", (con M. Burkart e D. Gromb), di prossima pubblicazione in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; "Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration and Legal Shareholder Protection", (con M. Burkart), di prossima pubblicazione, in Journal of Financial Intermediation; "Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets" (con S. Brusco), European Economic Review, aprile 2005; "Tender Offers and Leverage (con H. Mueller), Quarterly Journal of Economics, novembre 2004; "Mandatory Bids, Squeeze-out, Sell-out and the Dynamics of the Tender Offer Process" (con M. Burkart), in Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (a cura di G. Ferrarini, K.J. Hopt, J. Winter e E. Wymeersch), Oxford University Press, 2004; "Family Firms", (con M. Burkart e A. Shleifer), in Journal of Finance, ottobre 2003; "Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control" (con M. Burkart e D. Gromb), in Journal of Finance, aprile 2000; "Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders" (con M. Burkart e D. Gromb), in Journal of Political Economy, febbraio 1998, pp. 172-204; "Large Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm" (con M. Burkart e D. Gromb), in Quarterly Journal of Economics, agosto 1997, pp. 693-728.