2,5 days in face-to-face: 26-28 November 2018

Distance Learning (4 hours): 12-25 November 2018

Value drivers

•    Mix of theory and practices from management science and economic science
- Intellectual and theoretical foundations
- Hands-on experience through experiments and case histories
- Basic empirical evaluation of auctions rules and mechanisms

•    Case history didactic approach
- Cases representing different contexts and buyer/seller objectives
- Experimental approach from buyer and seller perspective

•    1-to-1 approach with specific company challenges
- Procurement Auction design assignment
- Bidding strategy definition and support


The programs is designed for both procurement and sales practitioners:

  •          Chief Procurement Officers, Senior Buyers
  •          Chief Sales Officer and Commercial Representatives

The target audience:

  • Industry: Oil&Gas, Energy, Construction, TLC, Automotive, Pharma and wherever high value auction are used to select the partner and negotiate contract conditions (buy or sell side)
  • Company: Big corporations and wherever spending value or turnover value is managed through auctions (buy or sell side)
  • Consulting companies
  • Public institutions: central or regional governments, health care institutions with their procurement professionals


•    Procurement auctions: definition, characteristics, rules and parameters

•    Game theory approach: strategies, payoffs, information and equilibrium

•    Bidding strategy: rationality and behaviors in presenting the quotation
-    “Optimal” bidding
-    Typical biases and learning patterns
-    The effects of increased participation and competition
-    Cost structures (private vs. common) and their implications for bidding

•    Auction Design: how different auctions rules influence the equilibrium outcomes of the game
-    Sealed bid formats vs. open outcry ascending auctions
-    Revenue equivalence among auction formats: when it works and when it does not
-    Asymmetry: dealing with highly heterogeneous bidders
-    Auction design under multiple risks (timing/quality of delivery, collusion, corruption)

•    The game: mix & match in different contexts and markets
-    Bankruptcy risk in high stake auctions (TLC, infrastructure, etc.)
-    Collusion between suppliers: collusive strategies and countervailing measures
-    Multiple lots and divisible goods: arranging large scale or repetitive procurements
-    Methods to foster quality in procurement: ex ante selection, ex post monitoring, financial guarantees/surety bonding, vendor rating 
-    Renegotiations with current suppliers and attracting new comers

•    Case histories and in class experiments with tendering design and bidding strategyRetail strategy


Marco Ottaviani
Full Professor of Economics, Bocconi University.

Francesco Decarolis
Associate Professor of Economics, Università Bocconi

Nenad Kos
Associate Professor of Economics, Università Bocconi

Giuseppe Stabilini
SDA Professor of Procurement and Supply Management

Enrollment procedure

Please complete the enrollment request form, available on this web page, and mail or fax to:
SDA Bocconi School of Management
fax +39 02 5836.6833

The final deadline for enrollment is 23 October 2018.

Enrollment requests are reviewed on a rolling basis, those received after the final deadline may not be accepted. Please see details in the enrollment form.

Participation fee 

€ 3.900 + VAT (if required)

Special Payment Terms 

A 10% reduction on the program fee is offered to applications sent in by 13 September, 2018.


€ 3900.00 + IVA